Secure Smart Contracts with Isabelle/Solidity¹

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Joint work with Asad Ahmed, Achim D. Brucker, Naipeng Dong, Horacio Mijail, Billy Thornton, and Mark Utting

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Smart Contracts



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Solidity

```
Solidity
contract Bank {
   mapping(address => uint256) balances;
   function deposit() public payable {
       balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender] + msg.value;
   }
   function withdraw() public {
       uint256 bal = balances[msg.sender];
       balances[msg.sender] = 0;
       msg.sender.transfer(bal);
   }
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```

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Fallback Methods

}

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Applications Summary



Solidity contract Customer { contract Bank { mapping(address => uint256) balances; Bank bank; constructor(Bank b) public { function deposit() public payable { balances[msg.sender] = bank = b: balances[msg.sender] + msg.value; function deposit(uint v) public { bank.deposit.value(v)(); function withdraw() public { function withdraw() public { uint256 bal = balances[msg.sender]; bank.withdraw(); function() external payable { //received some funds

```
balances[msg.sender] = 0;
msg.sender.transfer(bal):
```

Solidity

Problems with Smart Contracts

It is estimated that since 2019, more than \$5B was stolen due to vulnerabilities in smart contracts Secure Smart Contracts with Isabelle/Solidity

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Isabelle/Solidity is a deep empedding of Solidity (v0.5.16) in Isabelle/HOL



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 $\label{eq:sabelle} \begin{array}{l} \mbox{Isabelle/Solidity is a deep empedding} \\ \mbox{of Solidity (v0.5.16) in Isabelle/HOL} \end{array}$

• Fixed-size integer types

with and without overflow.



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- *Fixed-size integer types* with and without overflow.
- *Domain-specific primitives*, such as transfer or balance.



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Isabelle/Solidity is a deep empedding of Solidity (v0.5.16) in Isabelle/HOL

- Fixed-size integer types with and without overflow
- Domain-specific primitives. such as transfer or balance
- Fallback methods which are executed with monetary transfers.





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Isabelle/Solidity is a deep empedding of Solidity (v0.5.16) in Isabelle/HOL

- Fixed-size integer types with and without overflow
- Domain-specific primitives. such as transfer or balance
- Fallback methods which are executed with monetary transfers.
- Different types of stores, such as storage, memory, calldata, stack.



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Isabelle/Solidity is a deep empedding of Solidity (v0.5.16) in Isabelle/HOL

- *Fixed-size integer types* with and without overflow.
- *Domain-specific primitives*, such as transfer or balance.
- *Fallback methods* which are executed with monetary transfers.
- *Different types of stores*, such as storage, memory, calldata, stack.
- *Extendable Gas model* to model computational costs.



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How to ensure compliance of the semantics





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• Verified Constant Solving





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Applications

- Verified Constant Solving
- Soundness of SSCalc





Applications

- Verified Constant Solving
- Soundness of SSCalc
- Verified Banking





What is achieved so far

- Formalisation of a subset of Solidity in Isabelle/HOL
 - Conservative extension guarantees semantic consistency
 - Deep embedding allows to reason about the language itself



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What is achieved so far

- Formalisation of a subset of Solidity in Isabelle/HOL
 - Conservative extension guarantees semantic consistency
 - Deep embedding allows to reason about the language itself
- Used in several case studies to verify ...
 - Gas-optimizer
 - soundness of Solidity calculus
 - concrete Solidity contracts



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What are we currently working on

• Shallow embedding to improve automation for the verification of contracts



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- Used in several case studies to verify ...
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 - soundness of Solidity calculus
 - concrete Solidity contracts

What are we currently working on

- Shallow embedding to improve automation for the verification of contracts
- First results are promising!





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References I

Publishing.

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Verified Constant Solving SSCalc Banking Contract



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Language Features

Fixed-size Integer Types Domain-specific Primitives Gas Model Method Calls Complex Data Types Assignments with Different Semantics

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SSCalc Banking Contract



- Signed and unsigned integers from 8...256 bits (with steps of 8 bits)
- Signed integer types are only compatible with unsigned types of smaller size
- If a value is too large for a size a silent overflow will occur



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SSCalc Banking Contract



- Signed and unsigned integers from 8...256 bits (with steps of 8 bits)
- Signed integer types are only compatible with unsigned types of smaller size
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assert(int8(200) == int8(-56));



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- If a value is too large for a size a silent overflow will occur

```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)); //true
```



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```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)); //true
```

```
assert(uint8(200) == uint8(-56));
```

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```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)); //true
```

```
assert(uint8(200) == uint8(-56)); //true
```

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- Signed and unsigned integers from 8...256 bits (with steps of 8 bits)
- Signed integer types are only compatible with unsigned types of smaller size
- If a value is too large for a size a silent overflow will occur

```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) == uint8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) + int16(32600) == int16(-32736));
```

Solidity

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Complex Data Types Assignments with Different



- Signed and unsigned integers from 8...256 bits (with steps of 8 bits)
- Signed integer types are only compatible with unsigned types of smaller size
- If a value is too large for a size a silent overflow will occur

```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)): //true
assert(uint8(200) == uint8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) + int16(32600) == int16(-32736));
                                                    //true
```

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Complex Data Types Assignments with Different

- Signed and unsigned integers from 8...256 bits (with steps of 8 bits)
- Signed integer types are only compatible with unsigned types of smaller size
- If a value is too large for a size a silent overflow will occur

```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) == uint8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) + int16(32600) == int16(-32736)); //true
assert(uint16(100) + int16(32700));
```

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- Signed and unsigned integers from 8...256 bits (with steps of 8 bits)
- Signed integer types are only compatible with unsigned types of smaller size
- If a value is too large for a size a silent overflow will occur

```
assert(int8(200) == int8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) == uint8(-56)); //true
assert(uint8(200) + int16(32600) == int16(-32736)); //true
assert(uint16(100) + int16(32700)); //compiler error
```

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- External vs. contract accounts
- Query account balances
- Transfer money



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- External vs. contract accounts
- Query account balances
- Transfer money

uint256 x = 0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.balance; uint256 y = address(this).balance;

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- External vs. contract accounts
- Query account balances
- Transfer money

uint256 x = 0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.balance; uint256 y = address(this).balance;

0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.transfer(1000);



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- External vs. contract accounts
- Query account balances
- Transfer money

uint256 x = 0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.balance; uint256 y = address(this).balance;

0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.transfer(1000);

```
assert(0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.balance == x+1000);
//true
```

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- External vs. contract accounts
- Query account balances
- Transfer money

```
uint256 x = 0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.balance;
uint256 y = address(this).balance;
```

0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.transfer(1000);

assert(0xAb8483F64d9C6d1EcF9b849Ae677dD3315835cb2.balance == x+1000);
//true

```
assert(address(this).balance == y-1000); //true
```

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Gas Model

- Execution costs Gas
- Programs are guaranteed to terminate
- No specification for Gas costs at Solidity level

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Gas Model

- Execution costs Gas
- Programs are guaranteed to terminate
- No specification for Gas costs at Solidity level

while (true) {}
//terminates with an out of gas exception



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Method Calls

Recently we added support for *method calls*

- Internal vs. external
- Send money with external calls
- Money transfer triggers fallback

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Method Calls

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Complex Data Types

- Three types of stores: storage, memory, calldata
- Mappings can only be kept in storage
- Arrays can be kept in all types of stores



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Complex Data Types

- Three types of stores: storage, memory, calldata
- Mappings can only be kept in storage
- Arrays can be kept in all types of stores

```
contract Example {
 mapping(address => uint256) myMapping; //storage map
 uint8[2][3] myStorageArray; //storage array
 //calldata arrav
 function example(uint8[2] calldata myCDArray) external {
   uint8[2] storage myPointer = myStorageArray[1]: //storage pointer
   uint8[2] memory myMemoryArray; //memory array
 }
```

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- Assignment between memory moves pointer
- Assignment between storage copies (except for pointers)
- Assignment between memory and storage copies



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- Assignment between memory moves pointer
- Assignment between storage copies (except for pointers)
- Assignment between memory and storage copies

Solidity //initialized with 0 int[2] memory x; int[2] memory y; x=y; x[1]=1;	Solidity int[2][2] memory x; int[2][2] memory y; x[1]=y[1]; x[0][0]=1; x[1][1]=1:	Language Features Fixed-size Integer Types Domain-specific Primitives Gas Model Method Calls Complex Data Types Assignments with Different Semantics Testing Example Applications
<pre>assert(y[1] == 1); //true</pre>	<pre>assert(y[0][0] == 1); //false assert(y[1][1] == 1); //true</pre>	Verified Constant Solving SSCalc Banking Contract



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- Assignment between memory moves pointer
- Assignment between storage copies (except for pointers)
- Assignment between memory and storage copies



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Example





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Verified Constant Solving

int16 x;

// costs 20 Gas
x = int16(250) + uint8(500);

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Solidity int16 x; // costs 8 Gas x = int16(494);



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SSCalc

Specification

- Invariant over member variables and balance
- Pre/post-conditions for internal methods

Verification

- Constructor establishes invariant
- External methods preserve invariant
- Preconditions imply postconditions for internal methods

```
Solidity
contract Example {
 uint x:
 constructor(uint v, ...) public {
   ... x = y; ...
 function int1(uint y, ...) internal {
   ... ad1.call.value(1 ether)(abi.
        encodeWithSignature("ext()")); ...
 function ext() external {
   ... int1(5, ...); ...
   ... ad2.transfer(1 ether); ...
 function () external payable {
   . . .
```

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Banking Contract



DM and B. Thornton. SSCalc: A calculus for Solidity smart contracts. SEFM 2023.

Verification of Banking Contract

```
\sum_{a} \texttt{balances}(a) \leq \texttt{balance}
```

```
Solidity
contract Bank {
   mapping(address => uint256) balances;
   function deposit() public payable {
       balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender] + msg.value;
   }
   function withdraw() public {
       uint256 bal = balances[msg.sender];
       balances[msg.sender] = 0;
       msg.sender.transfer(bal);
   }
ን
```

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